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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines British trade and growth in general equilibrium. It rejects Peter 
Temin's contention that the Crafts-Harley 'new view' of sectorally concentrated 
productivity growth during the Industrial Revolution is inconsistent with actual 
industrial exports. A CGE trade model with diminishing returns in agriculture that also 
emphasizes demand conditions indicates that while technological change in cottons and 
iron were major spurs to exports, the demand for food imports generated by population 
growth and diminishing returns in agriculture also stimulated trade . The trade data are 
compatible with the 'new view ' and any implied adjustment to TFP growth estimates is 
slight. 
JEL Classifications: F14; N73; 052 
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In traditional accounts of the British Industrial Revolution, as set out in famous books 
by T.S. Ashton and David Landes, technological change occurred widely through the 
economy and provided the engine that initiated modern economic growth. I Phyllis 
Deane and W.A. Cole's pioneering estimates of British national income provided 
support for this view . 2 Later reassessment of the quantitative evidence suggested that 
Deane and Cole had substantially overestimated British growth before 1840 3 In putting 
forward this revised view, N.F.R. Crafts and C. Knick Harley indicated that the overall 
productivity impact of technological change in aggregate was much slower and more 
concentrated in a few industries than had been generally assumed. The famous 
modernizing sectors of the Industrial Revolution and a precocious British agriculture 
accounted for almost the entire aggregate productivity growth. 4 The Crafts-Harley 
view, although it has received wide support, has disturbed many commentators who 
find its implications hard to reconcile with the economic structure and the pattern of 
trade of the mid-nineteenth century British economy. Initial unease focussed on Crafts's 
conclusion that technological change in agriculture exceeded the rate of technological 
change in the rest of the economy, with the obvious exception of the textiles and metal 
industries at the heart of the Industrial Revolution. How, if agriculture was so 
productive, did Britain come to be an economy with a declining agricultural sector and 
I Ashton, Industrial Revolution; Landes, Unbound Prometheus. 
2 Feinstein, "Capital Accumulation ", p. 141 ; Deane and Cole, British Economic 
Growth, p. 78, 283. 
3 Harley , "British Industrialization", Crafts, British Economic Growth, and Crafts and 
Harley, "Output Growth" . 
4 Harley, "British Industrialization", Crafts, British Economic Growth, and Crafts and 
Harley , "Output Growth" . 
an increasingly large exporter of manufactured goods?5 Recently , Peter Temin has 
extended the challenge using a theory of international trade that incorporates 
technological change . He argued that the continued export of manufactures from sectors 
beyond those famously transformed by the Industrial Revolution implied widespread 
technical change in British industries during the early nineteenth century 6 
Trade data, because of their availability and reliability and because they reveal 
comparative advantage, have always been an important source of evidence about 
economic growth. In this paper, we explore the British economy during the Industrial 
Revolution using a general equilibrium model that incorporates international trade. Our 
model, although a radical simplification of historical reality , is considerably more 
complex than the parsimonious model that Peter Temin relied upon . We think, 
however, that Temin's model abstracted from key elements of the Industrial Revolution 
and consequently he arrived at erroneous conclusions. 
We feel that any realistic modeling of the Industrial Revolution must include three 
features that Temin ignored: First, British population grew very rapidly but land 
resources were effectively constant. Second, the British industries of the Industrial 
Revolution, and particularly cotton textiles, became very large relative to world 
markets for their products and their output levels crucially affected world prices of 
these goods. Third , the conventionally defined industries produced a variety of goods 
that were at best imperfect substitutes for one another and goods within categories of 
5 Harley, "British Industrialization", Crafts, British Economic Growth, and Crafts and 
Harley, "Output Growth" . 
6 Harley, "British Industrialization", Crafts, British Economic Growth , and Crafts and 
Harley , "Output Growth". 
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the trade statistics were a heterogeneous bundle of imperfect substitutes. Examination 
of a computational general equilibrium model with these features comfortably 
reconciles our view of the broad outlines of technological change with the history of 
British trade . The model also reveals that the answer to our critics' concerns arises 
from aspects of the economy that we see as central in the history of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The model explains the general equilibrium evolution of Britain's mid-nineteenth 
century trade structure. First, increasing population in the face of limited land resources 
even with improving agricultural technology put upward pressure on British food 
prices . In the absence of trade , British food prices would have risen above the prices 
elsewhere. However, trade was possible so the demand for imports increased. 
Increased importS had to be paid for and, in general equilibrium, increased demand for 
imports leads to increased exports . Without the Industrial Revolution, British exports of 
various products probably would have expanded approximately in proportion to their 
levels around 1770. Of course, British carton textiles experienced spectacular 
technological change at this time and quickly captured export markets, independently of 
the demand for food imports. But we must keep in mind that the export success of 
British cotton textiles rested on the dramatic fall in the price of cloth. As a result, 
increased exports of cottons had a more limited general equilibrium effect in meeting 
the need to pay for increased food imports than it would initially appear. Exports 
increased dramatically but prices fell dramatically as well. As a result revenue from 
cotton exports grew much less than cotton exports 7 This limited growth of revenue, 
despite the spectacular increase in the volume of cotton exports , implied that the export 
7 In fact, if the elasticity of foreign demand had been sufficiently low, one or below, tbe 
revenue , and thus the food that could be purchased, from cotton exports would not have 
expanded at all. 
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of other commodities remained necessary to pay for food imports. Furthermore, some 
trade persisted within broad commodities independent of technological change because 
foreign and domestic goods within trade categories were not homogeneous. Exports of 
some specialized goods persisted even if relatively unfavorable technological change 
eliminated most exports in the category. 
TEMIN'S CRITIQUE AND THE USE OF THE RICARDIAN TRADE MODEL 
Peter Temin has recently proposed a test to discriminate between the old and new views 
of technological change during the Industrial Revolution that uses data on exports and 
imports . Temin argued, on the basis of a Ricardian model of the effect of technological 
change on international trade, that the fact that export of other manufactures (from the 
"unmodernized" sectors) continued as the Industrial Revolution progressed implied that 
technical change was widespread among British industries in the early nineteenth 
century.8 Other manufactures remained important exports through 1850, so he 
concluded that "the traditional, 'old-hat' view of the Industrial Revolution is more 
accurate than the new, restricted image ... The spirit that motivated cotton manufactures 
extended also to activities as varied as hardware and haberdashery , arms, and 
apparel.. . The low rate of productivity change shown [by Crafts and by Harley] for 
other activities is too low . There must have been more technical progress outside the 
listed sectors ... ,,9 Temin's conclusions also receive some support from Richard 
Sullivan's research into patenting. Sullivan examined patents within a sectoral 
breakdown that corresponds to Temin 's trade categories . Over the period 1781-1850, 
he found that only 20 .7 per cent of patents occurred in cloth and iron while 32.1 per 
8 Temin, "Two Views", pp . 72-3. 
9 Ibid ., p . 79 . 
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cent occurred in other exporting industries. lo He argued that the patenting evidence 
"attests to the widespread narure of invention and innovation during the first half of 
nineteenth cenrury England. ,,11 
We agree with Temin that it is important to enquire whether trends in external trade are 
consistent with interpretations of the Industrial Revolution. We do not, however, 
believe that Temin's conclusions are justified . His use of the simple Ricardian trade 
model embodies restrictive assumptions inappropriate to the historical circumstances. 
None the less, examination of the Ricardian model provides a useful starting point for 
examination of the relationship between technological change and trade in the Industrial 
Revolution . The model underlies Temin's conclusions. In addition, when suitably 
modified the same model provides insights into the results that we obtain with a more 
appropriate but more complex general equilibrium model. 
Temin's choice of model is in line with much of the theoretical literarure that 
investigates the effect of technological change on trade. A Ricardian model of trade 
with a continuum of goods produced with a single factor of production abstracts from 
complications that more complex specifications would introduce .12 An implication of 
the model is that each good will only be produced in one country and exported to the 
other , with the possible exception of one marginal good that may be produced in both 
countries but exported by only one. The theorists usually also simplify the demand side 
of the model and assume that consumers spend a constant share of their income on each 
10 Sullivan, "Out of the Bottle ", Table 1. 
11 . Ibid; p.3. 
12 Grossman and Helpman, "Technology" . 
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good. As Grossman and Helpman remark, "this simple continuum model gives sharp 
predictions" but, at the same time, there is a serious danger that the simplifications will 
be misleading in the analysis of historical data . 13 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Temin's Figure 1, which is reproduced here , shows his use of the model. Since there is 
a single factor of production, labor, the production technology Qf each good on the 
continuum may be represented by a single parameter, an , where an is the number of 
hours of labor needed to produce a single unit of good n in Britain. Similarly, a'n is the 
number of hours needed to produce a single unit of the good abroad. For any given 
ratio of British to foreign wages, British relative costs of goods (and prices if there 
were no trade) will be ranked , from low to high, according to the ratio of a'la -
Britain's relative technological advantage. We can conveniently order the continuum of 
goods produced along the horizontal axis according to Britain's relative technological 
advantage . At a high relative British wage (w/w'), Britain produces only those goods in 
which its technological superiority is greatest but as w/w' declines , Britain produces and 
exports more goods. Curve A in Figure 1 traces the goods produced in Britain as a 
function of the relative British wage rate given the relative technologies in the two 
countries. 
As the Britain produces more goods, its share in world income increases, and since all 
income from production accrues to wages in the producing country, its relative wages 
rise . If the home country produces all of the goods with an index less than z and the 
13 Ibid., p. 1287. 
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Thus we obtain the upward sloping curve B in Figure I where the relative wage rate is 
a function of the proportion of production occurring in Britain. Equilibrium occurs at 
the intersection of the A and B curves determining British relative wage and production. 
Britain produces and exports all goods to the left of Xo and imports all goods to the 
right. 
Temin uses Figure I to analyze the effects of technological change. General relative 
improvement in British technology would shift curve A to AI while leaving curve B 
unaffected . This would increase the range of goods exported by Britain to include all 
goods to the left of X I • 14 Temin also considers the case of technical changes restricted to 
a narrow range of goods already exported. In this case demand shifts to these now 
cheaper goods and, he argues, the B curve shifts to B' because the income of the 
producers increases as sales increase . The new equilibrium is to the left of the original 
point at x2 and the range of exports falls . He concludes "General technical change 
causes the list of exports to rise, while restricted technical change causes it to fall. This 
difference provides a test of [the two] views" . IS Moreover, the tendency for other 
manufactures to become imports would be intensified by TFP growth in agriculture that 
would cause these goods to move to the right in the array over time. 
14 Temin, "Two Views", p. 70. 
IS Ibid., pp. 72-3. 
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Temin's outcome is , however, a special case for several reasons. It does not provide a 
sound basis upon which to discriminate between competing accounts of productivity 
growth during the Industrial Revolution. Even if we accept the basic model, Temin's 
inferences rely on implicit assumptions concerning demand elasticities that may not be 
valid . More seriously, the model fails to recognize the importance of a fixed factor , 
land, in the agricultural production function and of differentiated goods within the 
categories listed in the trade statistics. In fact, serious consideration of demand 
elasticity and population growth within the Ricardian model, issues we consider central 
and that provide the focus of our modeling below, reveals how misleading Temin 's 
conclusions may be. Examination of the Ricardian model, perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly , also allow us to see why , contrary to Temin's assertion, Britain continued 
to export manufactured goods whose technology was not affected by the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The results we find using a more realistic model of British trade arise from three 
sources . First, diminishing returns in agriculture led to food imports that in turn 
required a growth in revenue from manufactured exports . Second, Britain became such 
a dominant producer of Industrial Revolution goods that it faced downward sloping 
demand curves for these goods . Third, the trade categories in the British customs, 
which Temin uses for his test, were amalgamations of the goods in the conceptual 
Ricardian model and so, while technology may have driven some goods from exports to 
imports, others in the same industry remained exports . The broad trade categories 
failed to document the switch that occurred. 
Let us start with the second of our concerns , the elasticity of demand for exports, 
because it fits directly into Temin's framework, and he seems to have failed to 
understand its significance. The elasticity of demand for the exports of the goods that 
experienced technological change matters. This is true both in Temin's restricted case 
8 
and in the more general case we discuss below. Temin asserts that technological change 
in a single (or narrow range ot) export industry will cause some goods that had been 
exports to become imports but this occurs within the model only under certain 
conditions of demand. If demand is inelastic , selective technological change in a single 
good will result in an increase in the quantity exported but price will fall more than in 
proportion and export earnings from that good will fall. Balance of payments 
equilibrium will require that some goods shift from imports to exports rather than the 
other way as Temin asserts. Under the assumption of constant expenditure shares 
(unitary elasticity of demand) usually used by theorists, the percentage increase in the 
quantity of exports will be matched exactly by the percentage fall in price . In this case 
the expendirure on the good (and command over other goods from its export) are the 
same. Consequently , after the technological change the B curve in Figure 1 will be 
unaffected. Since selective technological change shifts curve A upward only locally and 
not in the vicinity of xo, equilibrium and the range of exports is unchanged . In this case, 
the benefits of technological change occur only in lower product prices and are shared 
equally by all consumers whether they are in the producing or importing country. 16 
Only if demand is elastic , i.e ., the proportion of income spent on the good increases as 
its price falls, will the range of exports shrink in line with Temin's predictions. 
Differences in population (and labor force) growth affect the equilibrium distribution of 
production and trade . As is apparent from the formula for curve B presented above, a 
relative increase in domestic population will shift curve B downwards. Without 
technical change, even in the absence of diminishing returns , relative wages will fall in 
the country with the greater labor force increase . For that country, the B curve will 
16 Harley , "Reassessing", pp. 201-3 makes this argument for cotton in the Industrial 
Revolution . 
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shift down and at the new equilibrium there will be an expansion in its range of goods 
produced and exported. If a country increases its proportion of the total world labor 
force, equilibrium requires that it also increase its share of production and this can only 
occur by moving along curve A in response to a fall in relative wage rates . If, in 
addition, the Ricardian model's assumptions are modified to allow diminishing returns 
in agriculture, as we feel must be the case, this effect will be augmented . 
Consider a model with two types of goods: a set of Ricardian manufactured goods, each 
facing a unitary elastic demand , and an agricultural good produced with diminishing 
returns because of its dependence on land, a factor of production in fixed supply. 
Population increase, even if partially offset by technological change in agriculture, 
raises demand for agricultural goods, puts upward pressure on domestic agricultural 
prices and provokes increased agricultural imports . This will require an increase in 
export revenue. Within the model , an increase in export revenue can come only if some 
goods not previously exported are now exported . 
As will become clear below, predictions of the impact of technological change on 
British trade are highly sensitive to the specification of the agricultural production 
function . Temin's agricultural goods are produced by labor alone and without 
diminishing returns. This is surely inappropriate for modeling trade in late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century Britain where rapidly growing population pressed on land 
resources. Indeed, the standard view has been that land was to all intents and purposes 
a fixed factor and this was certainly a key feature of our own earlier discussions of 
productivity change in this period. 17 Moreover, this seems to be supported by trends in 
17 Crafts, British Economic Growth, pp. 117-8 and "Some Difficulties of 
Interpretation", p. 253, and Harley, "Reassessing", pp . 205-6 . For textbook assertions 
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agricultural rents that nearly tripled between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth 
centuries . 18 
Finally consider the issue of industries producing differentiated goods . In principle , 
their existence would not rule out the use of a Ricardian model. Indeed , recent 
developments in the theory of trade in differentiated products rely heavily on the 
model. Each differentiated product can be considered separately and placed individually 
on the continuum. An industry will encompass a range of differentiated products and its 
goods, both domestically produced and imported, will be less than perfect substitutes 
for one another. Intra-industry trade is a likely outcome, particularly if there are 
economies of scale. Intra-industry trade of this kind is indeed a prominent feature of 
British trade during the Industrial Revolution, as Temin's Tables 3 and 5 confirm. 19 
Problems' arise , however , when this type of Ricardian model is applied to data. A 
reduction in the number of export goods, when the goods are defined finely, may have 
occurred in the early nineteenth century as Temin 's model suggests . But much of the 
shift of goods between exports and imports will take place within product categories 
and will be masked in the aggregations that the trade data impose . 
Close examination of Temin's model shows that Temin's attempt to discriminate 
between the two views of the industrial revolution using the trade data would only be 
valid in a special case that did not obtain . Diminishing returns in agriculture, 
population growth and imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods -
see McCloskey, Industrial Revolution", p. 107 and Overton, Agricultural Revolution, 
p. 88 . 
18 Turner et aI., Agricultural Rent, ch. 8. 
19 Temin, "Two Views" , pp. 75 , 77-8 . 
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issues that must be recognized when the trade data are confronted - destroy the 
simplicity of the test that Temin proposes. Theoretical predictions are unclear when 
complications are introduced but a possible way forward is to examine the more 
complicated cases with simulations from computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models . 
CGE simulations (discussed in detail below) yield three clear conclusions . First, 
diminishing returns in agriculture and British technical precocity were both significant 
causes of the growth of exports of textiles and metal goods . Second, with diminishing 
returns in agriculture and realistic demand elasticities for textiles and metal goods, 
exports of other manufactures grow even with an assumption of no TFP growth in that 
sector. If rapid TFP growth is assumed in these goods, exports of these goods appear to 
grow far too much. Third, without diminishing returns in agriculture, the model cannot 
replicate the extent to which the modernized sectors grew. 
HARLEY'S 1993 CGE MODEL 
Agriculture is among the sectors that experienced relatively rapid TFP growth in the 
Crafts-Harley view of growth during the Industrial Revolution. This struck some critics 
as inherently implausible and inconsistent with rapid industrialization in an open 
economy. Thus, Jeffrey Williamson asked "why didn't the alleged rapid technological 
advance in agriculture encourage a shift in comparative advantage which would have 
been revealed by a contraction in agricultural imports and manufacturing exports? ,,20 
Harley 's 1993 CGE model was constructed to investigate this issue and he concluded 
20 Williamson, "Debating", p. 275. 
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that it demonstrated that the sectoral productivity growth estimates could be consistent 
with these aspects of the trade data 21 
The model, calibrated to embody Crafts's estimates of TFP growth, particularly 
highlighted three changes over the period 1770-1841. First, TFP advanced rapidly in a 
few key manufacruring industries but not in the rest of industry . Second, population 
grew rapidly and pressed on available land resources pushing up food prices and 
agricultural imports. Third , there was significant agriculrural TFP growth. British trade 
was affected in [Wo ways - prices of cotton textiles fell dramatically and exports 
soared while at the same time diminishing rerurns in agriculrure were only partially 
offset by agriculrural improvement so that food imports increased. Harley concluded 
that his model replicated the broad outline of changes in the output and trade of the 
British economy between 1770-1841. 22 
In outline the model was as follows. (A detailed specification is set out in the 
appendix). There are two trading countries - Britain and the rest of the world - each 
made up of four producing sectors : agriculrure, 'modern' industry (an aggregate of 
textiles and metals), other industry, and services. International trade is allowed in the 
first [Wo of these sectors only. The production technologies in most sectors are simple 
Cobb-Douglas production functions using only capital and labor. The agriculrural 
production function differs in that it has a land input; unchanged land input introduces 
diminishing rerurns into agriculrural output. The demand side of the model is also quite 
simple . Perfect substirution exists between foreign and domestic goods in agriculrure 
and modern industry. A representative consumer in each country has a utility function 
21 Harley, "Reassessing", p. 205 . 
22 Ibid ., p. 207. 
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in which there is a unitary elasticity of substitution between the modern and the other 
industrial good and a 0 .5 elasticity of substitution between the composite industrial 
good, services and agricultural output. 
Values of output in 1841 provided a benchmark to which the model was calibrated . 
Model solutions that incorporated changes in technology and factor supply allowed 
calculation of a comparative pre-Industrial Revolution equilibrium for 1770. Modeled 
British labor supply and capital stock increasing 2 .3 times between 1770 and 1841 
captured the effect of population pressure on fixed land resources . Industrial Revolution 
technological change was modeled as Hicks-neutral and taking place in modern 
industry , which used 2.8 times the resources per unit of output in 1770 as in 1841, and 
in agriculture, which, in 1770, used 1.75 times the resources per unit of output used in 
1841. The rest of the world was modeled as partially sharing technological change in 
modern industry , using 1.5 times the 1841 resources per unit of output in 1770. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 summarizes some of the key outputs from the model in columns 2 and 3 and 
compares them with those in columns 4 and 5 from a modified version of the model in 
which there is no specific land factor in agriculture and thus no diminishing returns . 
The exercise shows the importance in the 1993 model of diminishing returns in 
agriculture as a driving force promoting changes in international trade . Without 
diminishing returns in agriculture , modern industrial output would have grown only 3.3 
times rather than 6.9 times between 1770 and 1841 and the increase in agricultural 
imports would have been limited to only 1.4 times rather than 3.2 times . Industrial 
exports instead of growing 6.8 would have grown 2.3 times. This suggests that 
14 
diminishing returns in agriculture led to a near tripling of industrial exports independent 
of technological change. 
Thus, Harley 's 1993 model, designed to arbitrate in the debate between Crafts and 
Williamson on the compatibility of observed trade data with estimated patterns of 
productivity growth, emphasizes that population growth pressing hard against land 
resources provided an additional powerful force increasing industrial exports. The 
mechanism by which an increased demand for food generated increased manufactured 
imports is a central result from general equilibrium trade theory, but it is, perhaps, 
useful to spell it out here with reference to a simple Hume-type price-specie flow 
mechanism. If there were no increase in exports, increased British imports of food 
would result in an outflow of specie, a decline in the money supply and a fall in prices 
in Britain. The lower prices would stimulate increased exports. The process of specie 
outflow and price adjustment would continue until the value of exports (increased by 
falling British prices) equalled the increased food imports (moderated somewhat by the 
fall in British prices). In the 1993 model , by its construction, trade created by 
diminishing returns simply reinforced the trade in modern industrial goods. In a less 
restrictive specification, we might expect that the effect would be felt on other exports 
as well. 
A REVISED CGE MODEL TO RE-EXAMINE OUTPUT AND TRADE 
CHANGES 
Temin observed quite rightly that Harley's 1993 model is unduly restrictive and 
ahistorical in its assumption that other manufactures were non-tradables. If these goods 
were mode led as tradable, Temin contended that they should have become imported 
during the Industrial Revolution, given the Crafts-Harley view that they experienced 
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little or no TFP growth in contrast both with modern industry and agriculture. 23 In this 
section, we describe a CGE model that has been structured to capture the spirit of 
Temin's argument. Simulations of the model explore and reject his suggestion that the 
trade data refute the narrow view of technological change during the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The new model may be regarded as an implementation of an extended Ricardian model 
specified to take account of the criticisms we have of Temin's formulation . The 
extensions include diminishing returns in agriculture (as was assumed in the 1993 
model) and careful specification of the demand structure to allow for differentiated 
goods in industry (unlike the 1993 model) such that domestic and imported goods are 
imperfect substitutes . The calibration of the model retains most of the 1993 factor input 
and productivity growth assumptions , albeit with a more detailed specification. In the 
new model , agricultural productivity is assumed to grow in line with Robert Alien's 
recent estimates, that is a bit less rapidly with a unit of agricultural production using 
1.5 rather than 1. 75 times its 1841 inputs in 177024 The original non-tradable industry 
sector has been split into two equal parts, one tradable but the other not. 
In outline the new model is as follows . (A detailed specification can be found in the 
appendix). There are still two trading countries - Britain and the rest of the world -
23 Temin, "Two Views", p. 72 . 
24 Alien , "Agriculture". In fact, results are not that different if the higher (Crafts) TFP 
growth in agriculture is retained . Certain results are, however, better with the Alien 
rather than the Crafts specification. In making this change we are also in line with 
Alien's recent review of the evidence in "Tracking the Agricultural Revolution". We 
accept the arguments that he puts forward there to reject the alternative estimates in 
Clark, "Too Much Revolution" on the grounds that they are flawed by virtue of the 
sample of land prices that is used in construction of the price dual measure of TFP. 
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and, as before, the model is benchmarked at 1841 . There are now seven production 
sectors in Britain: agriculture, industry disaggregated into cotton textiles, other textiles, 
metal industries, other traded manufactures, other (non-traded) industry (primarily food 
processing and construction) and services. All except the last two are traded 
internationally. The rest of the world has eight sectors; in addition to the above seven, 
it also contains a tropical agricultural sector that produces both raw cotton and tropical 
foodstuffs that are imported by Britain. 
The production technologies generally remain quite simple and similar in both 
economies. In services, other traded manufactures and non-traded industry, the 
production functions are Co bb-Douglas with a labor share of 0.6 and a capital share of 
0.4 . Cotton textiles, other textiles and metal industries are modeled as having a fixed 
proportio~ technological requirement for raw material inputs and Cobb-Douglas value 
added . Although production technology in industry involves capital as well as labor, the 
specification is close to the Ricardian model because the industries use the factors in 
similar proportions. Relative cost changes result almost entirely from differential rates 
of technological change as they do in Ricardian models . Temperate agricultural 
production functions in both Britain and the rest of the world were modeled with aCES 
production function with an elasticity of substitution of 0.5 between labor and capital 
and an elasticity of 0 .3 between the capital and labor composite and land. In the 1841 
benchmark the value of agricultural output is shared among labor, capital and land in 
proportions of 0.4, 0.2, and 0.4 respectively . 
The demand side of the model is considerably more complex than in the 1993 model. 
The new model recognizes the heterogeneity of industrial output and distinguishes 
between domestic and imported goods, making them imperfect substitutes. That 
17 
heterogeneity requires differentiation between domestic and imported goods within the 
same industry has long been recognized in CGE trade models . The so-called Amlington 
specification models imported and domestic goods in the same industry as imperfect 
substitutes .25 The Arrnington utility function models the import good and its domestic 
counterpart as imperfect substitutes that are aggregated with a relatively high elasticity 
of substitution into a composite good which then enters a higher level utility function 
that has lower substitutability between categories of goods . 
We assume the Armington elasticity of substitution between the same category of 
domestic and imported good to be larger the more homogeneous the product in 
question . The elasticity of substitution between British and rest of the world cottons and 
metals is assumed to be 5 while those between other textiles and other traded 
manufactures are both assumed to be 2. The elasticity of substitution in the 
consumption function between aggregate textiles and other manufactures and among 
aggregate industry, temperate agricultural goods, tropical agricultural goods and 
services is taken to be 0.5. 
We do not have direct empirical estimates of these elasticities but we have selected 
foreign-domestic elasticities of substitution in line with values commonly used in CGE 
modeling.26 The substitution elasticities that we have chosen are also plausible in the 
context of the historiography of consumption and of the textiles industries in particular . 
Thus , Alien's recent review of elasticities of demand for agricultural goods implies a 
25 See, for example, the discussion in Shoven and Whalley, Applying General 
Equilibrium, p. 81. 
26 Compare the values selected by the authors of the papers in Srinivasan and Whalley, 
General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modeling and by Harley , "The Antebellum 
American Tariff" . 
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substitution elasticity with all other spending well below oneY Discussions of the 
cotton trade stress that while cottons were imperfect substitutes for linens, silks and 
woolens because of differences in durability, ease of washing and appearance, 
nevertheless there was fierce competition as cotton extended the range of its products to 
infiltrate its rivals markets 28 In the eighteenth century fine British cotton cloths were 
usually regarded as inferior to their Indian counterparts by the fashion conscious , but 
they were in direct competition. 29 By the mid-nineteenth century American and 
Continental cotton producers could challenge British production in coarse textiles but 
not in fine . 
[Insert Table 2] 
Simulation of the Industrial Revolution involves solving the general equilibrium model 
with lower factor supplies and inferior technology and yields the 1770 solution that is 
reported in Table 2 . The 1841 benchmark data are shown in column 1 for comparison. 
The results of the base case simulation are reported in column 3 of Table 2 together 
with the associated volume growth and changes in prices between 1770 and 1841 in 
column 4 . The latter can be compared with estimates of actual historical volume growth 
reported in column 2 as a check on the plausibility of the model. In general, the model 
replicates the growth in volumes of output and trade between 1770 and 1841 reasonably 
well , although in cases where volumes were very small in 1770 the multiples are less 
exact. In particular, the model captures key features of structural change during the 
27 Alien, "Tracking the Agricultural Revolution" . 
28 Farnie, English Cotton Industry, pp. 129-30. 
29 Edwards, British Cotton Trade, p. 44. 
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industrial revolution, namely, the relative decline of domestic agriculture and the rapid 
expansion of cotton textiles output and exports . 
Temin argued that the behavior of the trade of other traded manufactured goods was the ' 
key to discriminating between the traditional and new views of the Industrial 
Revolution. Notice, however, that the model generates significant growth in the exports 
of other traded manufactures even though the simulation allows zero TFP growth in the 
industry . The model's predicted export growth mirrors the historical result quite 
accurately . As might be expected for a sector lying near the margin of importation and 
exportation and whose goods were heterogeneous and imperfect substitutes, both 
exports and imports increased. This result is ruled out by Temin 's pure Ricardian 
model. The simulation suggests that the observed behavior of exports is consistent with 
the Crafts-Harley account of productivity growth in the Industrial Revolution. 
The simulation can also be judged in terms of its ability to replicate price changes in 
1770 relative to 1841. Here too, the picture is generally encouraging, especially in 
terms of cottons, other traded manufactures, and agricultural output which are central 
to the external trade outcomes . At the same time, it should be remembered that some of 
the price comparisons are necessarily rather crude given the lack of adequate data from 
which to construct benchmarks as is apparent from the source notes to Table 2. The 
most obvious weakness is the model's overestimate of the change in the price of 
agricultural land, which rises too much over the period. A possible reason for this is 
that technological change in agriculture may have been biased towards land saving 
whereas we have specified it as neutral. 30 
30 This is suggested by a simulation of the model in which agricultural technological 
change was specified as relatively land saving such that 1770 factor inputs were 0.75 
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[Insert Table 3] 
We further evaluated the model by performing a wide-ranging sensitivity analysis 
which altered key parameters . A few of these results are displayed in Table 3 which 
also reports the historical benchmark estimates in column 1 and the base simulation of 
the new model of Table 2 in column 2. We report in column 3 of Table 3 the 1770 
solution for a modified version of the new model where the assumption of diminishing 
returns in agriculture is dropped. As was the case in Table 1, exports in every export 
category are much smaller without the stimulus of diminishing returns in agriculture. 
The simulated behavior of trade in other traded manufactures is closer to Temin's 
inference of the implications of the Crafts-Harley view. Exports of other traded 
manufactures , while not actually lower , grow much more slowly than they actually did 
and imports of these goods expand rapidly - at a considerably more rapid rate than the 
actual historical outcomes. Even here, however, it should be noted that exports by no 
means disappear because domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes. The 
simulation confirms that population growth and diminishing returns in agriculture 
played an important role in expanding exports of other traded manufactures. 
Without diminishing returns in agriculture, as with the 1993 model, key aspects of 
economic development during the British Industrial Revolution are not replicated . In 
particular, the simulation shows agricultural output expanding 4.8 times between 1770 
and 1841 compared with an estimated actual doubling of output while output of cottons 
and metals in 1841 are only 38.3 times and 5.2 times 1770 respectively compared with 
land, 0.25 capital and 0.5 labor rather than 0.6, 0 .3 and 0.6 respectively. This 
replicated the land price change over 1770 to 1841 exactly while leaving the other main 
outputs of the model little changed with the one exception that cotton's growth was 
significantly reduced. 
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actual multiples of 125 and 14.3 . Similarly, simulated exports of cottons and imports of 
temperate agricultural products grow far more slowly than in fact they did. In addition, 
the prices of agricultural goods (and thus the cost of living) fall far too rapidly . In other 
words , without diminishing returns in agriculture , the key structural changes of the 
Industrial Revolution are seriously underestimated . The revised model, like Harley 's 
simple 1993 model , shows that diminishing returns in agriculture as well as 
technological change in modern industry played an important role in promoting the 
growth of modern industrial exports . 
As was noted above , we have no way of obtaining precise estimates of the elasticities in 
the utility functions . Accordingly , we paid considerable attention to the sensitivity of 
the model's results to variations in these values . Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 give a 
flavor of some of the results that we obtained and provide some insight into the role of 
demand elasticities in the growth of other manufactured exports . In column 4, rather 
against the general tenor of the literature, the elasticity of substitution in textiles was 
reduced from 2.0 to 1.0 thus making cotton a poorer substitute for other textiles , in the 
process diminishing the export demand elasticity for the premier Industrial Revolution 
good. This simulation replicates the historical benchmark less well than the base 
simulation. It also underlines the importance of demand conditions in cottons' 
extraordinary growth. With the lower demand elasticity the industry grows much more 
slowly. In column 5, the elasticity of substitution in consumption of manufactures was 
raised to I , which seems rather high for such a heterogeneous collection of goods . Here 
too the results are fairly similar to the base model and, in this case , actually slightly 
better with regard to growth of cotton outpurl l . Relative to the other simulations, the 
31 The simulations generate very small 1770 outputs, as of course did the history. As a 
result small changes in resource allocation make a considerable difference to growth 
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higher elasticity of substitution among the manufactured goods increased the exports of 
the goods whose prices had fallen most as a result of technological change. A 
consequence was somewhat slower growth of the exports of other manufactured 
goods. 32 Two important points to note about both simulations (and others not reported 
here) are the following. First, most key outputs of the model are not very highly 
sensitive to the assumed Armington elasticities . Second, in each case the simulated 
growth in exports of other traded manufactures is robust to the changes . 
Temin's assertion that Britain could have exported other manufactured goods only if 
they had achieved substantial rates of productivity growth seems thoroughly discredited 
by these results from a model simulation in which there is no TFP growth in those 
industries. It remains interesting , however, to examine what the impact of technological 
change in the other exportable manufactured goods would be in the context of the CGE 
model. We have explored two cases incorporating TFP growth in other traded 
manufactures. In the first , reported in column 3 of Table 4, we assumed TFP growth at 
0.2 per cent per year in other manufactures. In the second, in column 4, we assumed 
TFP growth at 0.5 per cent per year, i.e., about the low end of the rates for 
modernized sectors. In both cases we have used a demand function with the elasticity of 
substitution in manufacturing raised from 0.5 to 1 as in column 5 of Table 3. 
[Insert Table 4] 
rates. The calculated 1770 value in the base case is 0.10 and in the case with the higher 
elasticity of substitution among manufactured goods the value was 0 .08 
32 This result was further accentuated when the elasticity of the high level utility 
aggregation was increased from 0.5 to 1.0. 
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The main effect of TFP growth in the other traded manufactures shows up in the 
growth rates of output and exports . A 0.5 per cent TFP growth seems to result in an 
excessive growth of exports of other traded manufactures . The simulation with 0.2 per 
cent TFP growth in other traded manufactures, however, gives results that are a 
reasonable replication of the historical record . The only possible anomaly is the large 
increase in agricultural imports . The higher agricultural imports equilibrate the model 
as the means of spending the greater export revenue generated by more cheap 
manufactured goods capturing foreign markets . The simulations suggest that modest but 
not rapid TFP growth in other manufactured exports might be accommodated within the 
CGE framework. It should be noted, however, that this conclusion is not very robust. 
If the 0.5 substitution elasticity in manufacturing, which we prefer in the simulation 
above, is used in the exercise, even 0.2 per cent TFP growth produces excessive 
growth in exports of other traded manufactures . With 0.2 per cent TFP growth exports 
increase with a multiple of 2.9 while 0 .5 per cent TFP growth pushes the multiple up to 
4.2 - twice the actual historical growth. 
Finally , in other simulations not reported here, we considered the nearest equivalent to 
Temin's own specification in the context of the CGE model. In this case, diminishing 
returns are removed from agriculture and TFP growth is introduced into the other 
traded manufactured goods sector. With these assumptions, as Temin supposed , it 
clearly would be necessary to have rapid TFP growth in other exports to replicate the 
historical export experience - indeed, the model suggests that this TFP growth would 
have to be well in excess of 0.5 per cent per year. But as with Table 3, this 
specification generates agricultural output growth that is far too rapid and growth of 
modern sector output and exports and of agricultural imports that are much too slow. 
These simulations appear to be much less satisfactory than the base case of Table 2. 
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Our CGE simulations indicate that Temin's attempt to discriminate between different 
views of technological change during the Industrial Revolution by observing that the list 
of exported goods does not change significantly through the early nineteenth cenrury is 
based on an inadequate view of British trade. Our general equilibrium model illustrates 
the likely mechanisms that maintained exports even in industries where technological 
change was either modest or non-existent. Clearly, diminishing rerurns in agriculrure, a 
clear fearure of the early nineteenth century, played a key role. An effective demand 
for food imports required greatly expanded export earnings from industrial goods 
generally . The inelastic demand that faced the new industries of the Industrial 
Revolution resulted in the price of these goods falling in response to technological 
advance . This in rurn limited the export earnings from these products. Some of the 
expanded export earning came from traditional exports whose production had not been 
transformed. To realistically approximate historical reality as recorded in census and 
customs categories, we needed models with less than perfect substitution between the 
imported and exported goods in the broad , somewhat heterogeneous , categories. This 
specification greatly increases the likelihood that exports of goods from sectors 
experiencing relative technological retardation will continue to be recorded in the trade 
data . While it is likely that, in a Ricardian way, some specific goods ceased to be 
exported, it would be hidden in the aggregation in the historical data. When we extend 
Temin's basic Ricardian model to improve its realism, we can see why industrial goods 
where there was no TFP growth continue to be exported despite the concentration of 
technological change in the modernized sectors. 
It must be recognized, however, that we do not have enough information to use a CGE 
model of this type to go beyond general tendencies and make firm predictions about 
specific quantitative details. In particular, we lack estimates of the elasticities that are 
central to the specification of the demand side of the model and affect the pattern of 
trade . In particular, we do not feel we can rule out modest TFP growth in other 
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manufactures. But, we have shown strongly that the continuation of exports of other 
manufactures certainly cannot be taken as convincing evidence that technology changed 
in these industries at a rate comparable to that in modern industry or even in 
agriculture . 
The present model allows us to gain considerable insight into the way trade patterns 
were affected by the Industrial Revolution. There are, nonetheless, a number of ways in 
which it could be developed further. We have already noted that it may be appropriate 
to consider bias in agricultural technological change to explain the observed course of 
factor prices and factor input ratios. The model also seems deficient in its treatment of 
the metal industries where it inadequately replicates actual trade performance. 
Addressing this issue, and possibly others , effectively would require considerable 
extension of the model. In the case of the metal industries it would be necessary to 
disaggregate the heterogeneous output. Two obvious issues are the imports of iron bars 
in the eighteenth century which were inputs into later stages of metal production, and 
the intermediate demand for iron created by rail roads in the nineteenth century. In 
addition, the model pays little attention to the complex pattern of protection, both tariffs 
and prohibitions that were common in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
and affected British iron among other goods. Similar modifications might be useful 
elsewhere as well. In particular, if, as seems appropriate , the model allowed faster 
technological progress in other textiles in Britain than elsewhere, simulation would 
underestimate the industry's pre-Industrial Revolution exports and thus predict faster 
growth than actually occurred. The most likely solution in this case seems to lie in the 
changed trading relationship with America. Before the American Revolution the 
colonies were major markets; in the nineteenth century the industry faced protective 
tariffs there . 
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TFP GROWTH IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION REVISITED 
Temin examined trade patterns for inferences about aggregate TFP growth and its 
sectoral breakdown. While we have shown above that his inferences from trade data 
were unwarranted, it is still worthwhile to consider the view of sectoral and economy-
wide TFP growth that Temin was explicitly challenging. 33 A decomposition of 
aggregate TFP, originally set out by Harley, is reported in Table 5. In sectors where 
information is available , the contribution of a sector consists of its own estimated rate 
of TFP growth weighted by its share in gross output. The overall rate of TFP growth 
was calculated from macroeconomic estimates and the balance remaining after the 
contribution of individual sector was assigned to 'all others' .34 We can examine how the 
calculation would be modified if we concluded that inferences from the trade data 
indicated a larger contribution from 'other manufactures' . 
[Insert Table 5] 
If we continue to accept the estimate of overall TFP growth, which derives from 
subtracting an appropriately weighted average of estimated input growth from estimated 
GDP growth, an increased TFP in 'other manufactures' implies that the residual 
estimate for the rest of the economy would fall somewhat (variant 1) . Alternatively , we 
might imagine that the estimate of overall TFP growth should be increased to 
33 Temin, "Two Views", p. 79. 
34 Harley , "Reassessing" , p. 200 . Putting the calculations on a gross output basis and 
taking explicit account of intermediate input use follows the procedure originated by 
McCloskey, "Industrial Revolution", p. 114. The weights add up to more than 1 
because the sum of gross output exceeds that of value added; see, Gollop and 
Jorgenson, "US Productivity Growth", for the algebra of this type of growth 
accounting . 
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incorporate the higher estimate of TFP in 'other manufactures' - although nothing in 
our trade evaluation has directly affected the overall estimate of TFP (variant 2) . Our 
discussion in the last section suggested that a CGE interpretation of the evidence of the 
trade data might be consistent with TFP growth in 'other manufactures' at a rate of 
about 0.2 per cent per year but not with much faster TFP growth in that sector. Table 5 
reports variant 1 and variant 2 of the productivity growth decomposition for this case . 
At most, these modifications (variant 2) would raise the contribution of all other sectors 
from about 4 per cent to about 10 percent of overall TFP growth . This change, 
contrary to Temin's claims, leaves the Crafts-Harley view essentially unaffected . 
Indeed, a little mental arithmetic reveals that even an assumption of substantially faster 
TFP growth in other manufactures would not alter either the TFP growth 
decomposition or the estimate of overall TFP growth a great deal. This is hardly 
surprising when we recognize that any evidence of greater productivity growth in other 
internationally traded manufactures affects a sector that had a relatively modest share of 
total output. 35 In particular, a large part of the economy, amounting to over a third of 
GDP, comprised non-traded services and the evidence of the trade data is completely 
irrelevant to estimates of productivity growth in those activities. 
The evidence of the trade data certainly fails to discredit our earlier estimates of overall 
TFP growth during the Industrial Revolution . We have previously acknowledged their 
inevitable crudeness given the quality of the available data. In this context, however, it 
is worth remembering that some of the biases such as measuring labour inputs by 
35 Our 1841 benchmark gives these sectors 8.7 per cent of value-added (see Table 2) 
based on the sectoral weights in Harley, "British Industrialization", p. 269. Our 
assumption of a weight of 20 per cent in gross output in Table 5 errs on the high side 
but is convenient to bias the calculations against our view. 
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persons rather than hours worked may well lead to TFP growth being overestimated.36 
Certainly we welcome continued investigation of our estimates. Peter Temin's 
imaginative use of trade data has stimulated us to understand the Industrial Revolution 
better in a general equilibrium framework than we would otherwise have done. 
Examination of the trade statistics has deepened our view of the British Industrial 
Revolution but does not warrant major adjustments in our view of its essential 
character. 
We accept that at some point our estimates may need to be seriously revised when 
better data are obtained. It would, however, be unwise to be dismissive of the growth 
accounting estimates. Critics should recognize that some of the difficulties that arise in 
estimating TFP growth in recent times are actually much less serious in the British 
Industrial Revolution than they are in modern economies. There are two major 
problems in measuring TFP growth. First, what are the appropriate relative weights to 
be given to capital stock and labor force growth? Secondly, how should growth 
accounting allow for quality changes/new goods in the growth of real output? Both 
these are probably relatively minor in the early nineteenth century. We pointed out on 
an earlier occasion that the weighting problem is rendered relatively small because the 
growth rates of the capital stock and the labor force differ by only about 0 .1 percentage 
points during the key decades of the Industrial Revolution. 37 William Nordhaus recently 
investigated the issue of quality change and has assessed the degree to which it may 
matter. He found that 'run of the mill' sectors in which there was little to worry about 
36 Crafts and HarJey, "Output Growth", p. 719. 
37 Ibid., pp . 718-9. 
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comprised less than a third of expenditure in the 1990s but they made up as much as 
three quarters of expenditure in the early nineteenth century . 38 
We feel that the picture we have drawn of TFP growth and the Industrial Revolution is 
quite plausible in the light of modern economic analysis. Modern econometric research 
has done much to clarify where rapid TFP growth has come from in recent times . In 
general, such analyses suggest that only a relatively small part of measured TFP growth 
is attributable to technological change whereas relatively large proportions come from 
scale effects and improvements in the allocation of resources. For example, Nicola 
Rossi and Gianni Toniolo found that the component of Italian TFP growth attributable 
to technical change was about 0.1 out of 0.8 per cent per year in 1895-1939 and about 
0.5 out of 3.0 per cent per year in 1950-1990.39 Similarly, Susanto Basu and John 
Fernald found that, for the US business sector, only 0.2 out of 1.1 per cent per year 
TFP growth in 1950-1989 was due to technological change 40 
Arnold Harberger has recently examined the sectoral pattern of TFP growth in the 
United States. He found that contributions to real cost reduction are typically 
concentrated in relatively few industries. For example, between 1980 and 1991 about 
40 per cent of industry accounted for 100 per cent of TFP growth41 The post-war 
American economy can hardly be accused of a lack of inventiveness and its investment 
in research and development is many times larger relative to GDP than that of 
38 Nordhaus , "Do Real Output and Real Wage Measures Capture Reality?" 
39 Rossi and Toniolo, "Catching Up", p. 550 and idem, "Italy", p. 435 . 
40 Basu and Fernald, "Aggregate Productivity", Table 2a. 
41 Harberger, "Vision", p. 6. 
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nineteenth century Britain. It would not really be surprising if the inventiveness that 
Sullivan sees in the British patenting data failed, by itself, to produce rapid TFP 
growth. Moreover, we know that spectacular inventions reflected in substantial clusters 
of patents sometimes raise TFP very little, at least initially. For example, the social 
savings from the steam engine have been estimated as no more than 0.2 per cent of 
GDP in 1800.42 By the same token, we have already made clear that our finding that 
there was little or no TFP growth in much of the Industrial Revolution economy should 
not be taken to indicate a complete absence of innovation outside the modernized 
sectors. 43 The slow rate of TFP growth surely reflects the weakness of scale effects 
long before the era of Fordism. Even in cotton textiles, the epitome of the factory 
system, the median size of cotton mills in Manchester in 1841 was 174 employees and 
minimum efficient size was probably as low as 150 workers .44 Detailed analysis of the 
American economy shows that rapid TFP growth is a phenomenon of the twentieth 
rather than the nineteenth cenrury. 45 
CONCLUSIONS 
The nature of the Industrial Revolution continues to be debated. The Crafts-Harley 
view that aggregate TFP growth in the British Industrial Revolution was moderate and 
concentrated in relatively few sectors of the economy has gained wide support but 
doubts persist. In particular, critics have been concerned by apparent inconsistency 
between this view of change and Britain' s external trade experience. The question was 
42 Von Tunzelmann, Steam Power, p. 157. 
43 Crafts and Harley , "Output Growth", p . 719. 
44 Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux, "Size of Firms" , p. 75 . 
45 Abramovitz, "Search for the Sources". 
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posed originally by Jeffrey Williamson and now, in a new guise, by Peter Temin. We 
have addressed the issue with a general equilibrium model that embodies what we see 
as essential characteristics of the British economy. Simulations with this model support 
our position and also provide valuable insights into the operation of the British 
economy in its international context during the Industrial Revolution. 
The model indicates that the pattern of British trade in the mid-nineteenth century can 
fit easily into our view of technological change. To be sure, Britain' s technological 
leadership in cottons and iron production was a major source of export growth. But the 
pattern of trade evolved under other important influences as well. The rapid growth of 
British population was the first of these . Higher population inevitably increased the 
demand for food and British agriculture, with limited land resources, experienced 
diminishing returns and rising costs and prices despite impressive technological change. 
Since imports provide a relatively elastic source of food, imports increased. The 
exports of the technological leaders paid for much of this increase in imports , but the 
revenue from these exports was limited by the relative inelasticity of foreign demand . 
The rapid increase in cotton and iron exports occurred in response to rapidly falling 
prices and foreign exchange revenue increased much more slowly than export volumes. 
Old exports continued, despite the absence of technological improvement, for two 
reasons . First, they had a role to play in financing greatly expanded food imports . 
Second, many of the exported goods were of products of special character. Similar 
foreign goods differed from the British exports and were only poor substitutes in the 
eyes of foreign buyers . 
We continue to believe that the exceptional feature of the British Industrial Revolution 
was rapid structural change culminating in a very low share of agricultural employment 
in the mid-nineteenth century rather than fast growth. Britain's structural 
transformation occurred in an open economy context that needs to be understood. The 
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general equilibrium model we have constructed here underlines that both substantial 
TFP growth in part of the manufacturing sector and diminishing returns in agriculture 
contribute importantly to precocious British industrialization. The best estimates we 
have continue to suggest that growth during the Industrial Revolution was slower than 
used to be thought and modest by later standards. This does not detract from the fact 
that the period saw unprecedented technological progress while the economy coped 
successfully with population pressure that would have undermined living standards in 
earlier times . Equally, however, the increased inventiveness that was displayed is no 
reason to suppose that there was rapid or pervasive TFP growth . 
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APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF HARLEY'S 1993 MODEL 
The CGE modeling in this paper has all been carried out with the aid of Thomas 
Rutherford's MPS-GE modeling software. The modeling process starts with a social 
accounting matrix that is taken to represent an initial equilibrium for the economy. 
Appendix Table 1 presents the benchmark matrix for the 1993 model. Model sectors 
(production functions in the model) are arrayed along the left-hand side of the matrix. 
Goods , the outputs ( + ) and potentially , inputs (-) in the production functions are 
arrayed along the top of the matrix. Positive entries in the cells are outputs of the 
industry. Inputs would appear as negative entries, but this very simple model has no 
intermediate inputs. The last three columns on the right in the table list the factor 
incomes generated in each industry. The unit of measure is one per cent of British 1841 
GNP. 
[Insert Appendix Table 1] 
The data for the table are derived primarily from the estimate of national income in 
current prices for 1841 given by Deane and Cole .46 The industrial sector is divided on 
the basis of Harley's estimate of industrial shares in value-added .47 The modern 
industrial sector consists of the textile and metal industries. Factor incomes were 
allocated to be consistent with the parameters assumed for the Cobb-Douglas 
production functions for each sector. Modern industry was modeled as relatively capital 
intensive with a capital share of 0 .6 and a labour share of 0.4. Agriculture was modeled 
with both labor and land shares of 0.4 and a capital share of 0 .2 . All other sectors have 
a labor share of 0 .6 and a capital share of 0.4 . 
46 Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth , p. 166 . 
47 Harley, "Output Growth", p. 269. 
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The benchmark for the Rest of the World provides a large but not overwhelming 
international trading partner for Britain. The overall size of the Rest of the World is set 
in proportion to the ratio of European to British population . The size of the modern 
sector is calibrated relative to the British modern sector using the estimates of 
Bairoch.48 Other manufacturing and services are assigned slightly smaller shares of 
national income than was the case in Britain and the balance of national income is 
assigned to agriculture. The production functions and factor shares in each sector in the 
Rest of the World are assumed to be identical to those in Britain . 
Only two of the produced goods are internationally tradable - modern industrial goods 
and agricultural goods. Trade in modern industrial goods occurs without transport or 
transactions costs so that the price of the good is identical in both countries . Trade in 
agricultural goods, effectively British imports, is assumed to incur transport costs that 
increase as the quantity of imports rises , reflecting the fact that increased British food 
imports had to draw on more distant sources of supply. In the model increased 
transport costs take the form of assuming that one unit of British agricultural imports is 
produced by combining 0.5 units of foreign agricultural goods with 0.5 units of a 
foreign-produced transport service. The price of transport services falls (rises) as its 
output falls (increases) because it is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function 
in which 40 per cent of its cost in the initial benchmark is accounted for by a fixed 
factor of production. The specification causes Britain's agricultural prices in the 1770 
simulation to be a little over a quarter cheaper relative to European agricultural prices 
than in the 1841 benchmark. 
48 Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels" . 
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The demand side of the general equilibrium model consists of a single representative 
consumer in each country . The consumer receives all the factor income and spends that 
income to maximize utility. The consumers have the same constant elasticity functions 
in each country . The function assumes that modern industrial goods and other industrial 
goods have a unitary elasticity of substitution. This creates an aggregate manufactured 
good that enters into a higher level utility function with agricultural goods and services 
where the elasticity of substitution is set at 0 .5. 
In order to highlight the role of diminishing returns in Harley' s 1993 simulation, we 
created a slightly revised version of the model and re-ran the 1770 simulation. To 
eliminate diminishing returns , land was removed from the agricultural production 
function and the labour and capital shares were raised to 0.667 and 0.333 respectively. 
The 1770 results presented in Table 1 columns (4) and (5) are the result of solving the 
revised model with the same changes in technology and factor supplies as in the 
original 1993 model. 
APPENDIX 2: DETAILS OF REVISED CGE MODEL 
The model has been built using Thomas Rutherford's PPS-GE software. Models in this 
software begin with a consistent accounting matrix of product output, factor demand by 
product, factor incomes , and product demand . The accounting matrix is assumed to 
represent a full general equilibrium for the modeled economy . the quantities in the 
accounting matrix for the present model are presented in Appendix Table 2. The total 
factor incomes also represent the benchmark factor supplies. Benchmark prices are all 
taken to be 1.0, with the exception of the British price of tropical foodstuffs which is 
1.5 to allow for a 50 per cent import tariff. The model redistributes the tariff revenue to 
British consumers . Alternative equilibria are simulated by using specifications of 
36 
elasticities of substitution in both production and consumption to calculate a new 
equilibrium based on the original benchmark. 
[Insert Appendix Table 2] 
In the calculated equilibrium, factors in each country earn the same returns in all uses 
and all markets clear. Production and consumption functions are specified as constant 
elasticity relationships (and include the possibility of zero elasticity or no 
substitutability) . Considerable flexibility is possible in the models because it is possible 
to constuct subaggregates with different aggregation elasticities that can be used as 
inputs into the final production and utility functions. For computational reasons, 
substitution elasticities above 10 are not accommodated but perfect substitution among 
goods is easily modeled by having two production processes make the same 
commodity. 
[Insert Appendix Figure 1] 
Utility Functions. There are only two consumers in the model, one in Britain and one 
in the rest of the world . Although the benchmark consumption patterns of the two 
differ , the elasticities of substitution used to calculate new equilibria are identical. The 
structure of the utility functions is summarized in Appendix Figure 1. At the top level , 
consumers choose manufactured goods, temperate agricultural goods , services , and 
tropical foodstuffs . The elasticity of substitution among these goods is 0.5 . 
Services and tropical foodstuffs are simple produced goods. All services in each 
country are domestically produced - there is no trade in services . Tropical foodstuffs 
are all produced in the rest of the world. Temperate agricultural goods are produced in 
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both Britain and the rest of the world. The goods from each region are mode led as 
perfect substitutes in consumption. 
Modeling of the Industrial Revolution required disaggregations of the manufactured 
good that enters into the final utility function. The first disaggregation separated 
textiles, metal goods, other traded manufactured goods, and non-traded goods. These 
goods aggregated into a composite manufactured good using an aggregation (or utility) 
function with the same 0.5 substitution that characterizes the top level utility 
aggregation. Because our understanding of the Industrial Revolution emphasizes the 
special nature of the changes in cotton textiles, textiles were further disaggregated into 
cotton and other textiles. It seemed appropriate to allow greater substitution between 
the textiles than was the case in higher levels of the utility function, so an elasticity of 
2.0 was chosen. 
Since the simulation focused on trade in the various commodities that entered into the 
consumers' utility functions , it was necessary to pay attention to the degree of 
substitutability between imports and domestic production. As indicated in the text, we 
decided that even at our level of disaggregation the various categories of goods were 
quite heterogeneous aggregates. In this case, it was generally inappropriate to consider 
imports and domestic production to be perfect substitutes. We adopted the procedure, 
generally used in empirical trade modeling, of an Armington specification. The greater 
the degree of heterogeneity in the goods in the model category, the lower the 
appropriate elasticity of substitution. Imported and domestically produced cotton goods 
and metal products were regarded as good substitutes and an elasticity of 5.0 was 
adopted in both cases. Other textiles and other traded goods are more heterogeneous 
and we adopted a lower (2.0) elasticity of substitution between imports and 
domestically produced goods. 
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Production Functions. Production functions in the two countries were specified with the 
same factor proportions and elasticities of substitution. Differences in the rate of 
technological change between countries were modeled in simulating the pre-Industrial 
Revolution equilibrium. Intermediate good inputs were specifically modeled in the 
textile industries and in metals. In terms of influencing the calculated equilibria, only 
the cotton textile intermediate demand for tropical raw materials (cotton) was vital. For 
most goods , production is specified as a simple Cobb-Douglas production function with 
capital and labor inputs. Other traded goods , non-traded manufactured goods, and 
services are all Cobb-Douglas functions and the income shares in the initial benchmark 
are 60 percent labor and 40 percent capital. 
Agricultural production functions (for both temperate agriculture and tropical foodstufss 
and raw materials) are somewhat more complex. The production function for temperate 
agriculture in both Britain and the rest of the world combines a capital and labor 
aggregate (aggregated with an elasticity of substitution of 0.5) with land. An elasticity 
of 0.3 is allowed between land and the capital/labor aggregate. The lower elasticity 
between land and other inputs was chosen to allow the share of agricultural income 
going to land to increase as land scarcity increased. Tropical foodstuffs and tropical 
raw materials are modeled as perfect substitutes in production. They are produced only 
in the rest of the world . Production technology is a CES production function using 
labor, capital and land with an elasticity of substitution of 0.5. In the initial benchmark, 
the value of agricultural output in all cases is shared among labor, capital, and land at 
proportions of 0.4, 0.2, and 0.4 respectively. 
Production in the manufacturing industries of the Industrial Revolution has been 
mode led in somewhat greater detail. In cotton textiles a fixed quantity of tropical raw 
materials (cotton) and non-traded manufactures are combined with a value added 
aggregation of capital and labor (in which 40 percent of the income goes to labor and 
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60 percent to capital) to produce a unit of output. Substitution between labor and capital 
occurs with an elasticity of 0.1 . At the benchmark production, 21 percent of output 
goes to labor, 31 percent to capital , 27 percent to tropical raw materials , and 22 percent 
to non-traded manufactures . Other textiles and metal production have a similar 
production structure, with fixed intermediate inputs and a Cobb-Douglas value added 
from capital and labor. The distribution of the value of production in other textiles at 
the benchmark is 26 percent to labor, 40 percent to capital, 7 percent to tropical raw 
materials (silk), and 27 percent to temperate agricultural goods (wool and flax) . The 
payments to inputs in metal production are 36 percent to labor, 54 percent to capital, 
and 9 percent to other traded manufactures (coal). 
British commodity trade in 1841 was characterized by significantly larger import values 
than export values . The model accommodates this imbalance by mode ling a British 
service export sector that paid for the excess commodity imports. The foreign consumer 
consumes these services directly in the top-level utility function. They are produced in 
Britain with a Cobb-Douglas production function with factor shares of 0.6 for labor and 
0.4 for capital. 
Simulations of 1770. The pre-Industrial Revolution equilibrium is calculated with lower 
factor supplies and inferior technology in various sectors . In addition, the tariff on 
tropical imports is removed and British service exports are eliminated so that 
commodity imports and exports are of equal value. British labor supply is reduced from 
52.1 to 22 .8. capital supply was reduced from its benchmark 39.1 to 14 .4. Land was 
also reduced by 15 per cent from 8.8 to 7 .5. Factor inputs in the rest of the world were 
reduced by about 30 per cent. labor fell from 279.9 to 200, capital from 170.9 to 120, 
and land from 127.6 to 87. 
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Various changes were introduced in technology. First, a unit of agricultural output was 
mode led as using 1.5 times its original inputs of land, capital, and labor (in the Alien 
technological change variants) or 1.75 times as much (in the Crafts variants). 
Technological change in British manufacturing was calculated to correspond 
approximately with the calculations made by McCloskey with the corrections in 
Harley.49 In cotton, the assumption was that real cost was about 6 times its 1841 level 
in 1770 and that the improved technology had only resulted in savings of capital and 
labor and not in intermediate inputs. As a result, a point on the production function for 
a unit of output used 2.4 units of labor and 3.6 units of capital instead of the 0.21 and 
0.31 units used in 1841. A similar procedure in other textiles, based on a real cost 
twice the 1841 level gave inputs of labor of 0.8 and capital of 1.2 in place of 0.26 and 
0.40 . The change in metal goods replaced a labor input of 0.36 with an input of 0.68 
and a capital input of 0.54 with an input of 1.36. This corresponds to an increase of 
real cost of about 70 per cent. Technological change has been introduced in the 
Industrial Revolution goods in the rest of the world but at a slower pace. The 
coefficients on the various components of value added are presented in Appendix Table 
3. 
[Insert Appendix Table 3] 
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Table 1. Diminishing Returns in Harley's 1993 Model. 
Diminishing Returns No Diminishing Returns 
1841 1770 1841 /1770 1770 184111770 
Benchmark 
Modem Industry 12.4 1.8 6.9 3.8 3.3 
Agriculture 22.1 8.2 2.7 3.5 6.3 
Other Output 65.5 27 .5 2.4 26.1 2.5 
Agricultural In1ports 6.8 2.1 3.2 5.0 1.4 
Industrial Exports 6.8 1.0 6.8 3.0 2.3 
Note: Units are percentages of 1841 national income. 
Source: Derived from Harley, "Reassessing", Table 3.8 and further experiments with the model 
on which it was based, see text 
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Table 2. Simulations of tbe Revised CGE Model. 
Benclunarks Simulation 
1841 184111770 1770 184111770 
Outputs 
Cottons 10.3 125 0.1 98.4 
Other Textiles 12.7 2.3 3.9 3.3 
Metal Industries 4.2 14.3 0.4 11.2 
Other Traded Manufactures 8.7 4 3.1 2.8 
Other Industry 8.7 4 2.3 3.8 
Agriculture 22 .1 2 9.6 2.3 
Services 41.8 2.5 14.7 2.8 
Exports 
Cottons 6.2 253 0.0 239 
Other Textiles 2.8 1.6 0.9 3.0 
Metal Industries 1.5 4 .5 0.0 31.1 
Other Traded Manufactures 2.9 2.1 1.2 2.3 
Imports 
Temperate Agriculture 7.1 6.8 0.5 15.3 
Tropical Raw Materials 3.6 15.9 0.0 130 
Tropical Food 3.0 3.2 1.5 2 .0 
Modem Industry 0.5 ? 1.0 0.5 
Other Traded Manufactures 0.4 ? 0.2 1.8 
Goods Price Relatives 
Cottons 7.5 7.5 
Other Textiles 2.1 2.7 
Metal Industries 1.8 2.5 
Other Traded Manufactures 1.0 1.1 
Other Industry 0.9 1.1 
Agriculture 1.2 1.2 
Factor Price Relatives 
Labor 1.0 1.0 
Capital 1.0 1.3 
Land 0.6 0.3 
Cost of Living 1.2 1.4 
Notes : Levels of outputs, exports and imports measured as percentages of 1841 national income. 
Price relatives are for 1770/1841 and measured relative to the price of labor in 1770/1841 (0.58 
in the benclunark based on Feinstein, "New Estimates") as numeraire. 
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Sources: Model solutions are from the computable equilibrium model described in the appendix. 
The estimates of the benchmarks in column 2 were obtained as follows. 
Outputs: based on Harley, "British Industrialization," p. 272 except for agriculture from Alien, 
"Agriculture,", p. 101 and services from Crafts, British Economic Growth, p. 37 extended using 
Deane and Co le, British Economic Growth, p. 166. 
Exports: from Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 469, 471 extended to 1841 using Davis, 
The Industrial Revolution, pp. 98-100 except for Other Industry which was calculated directly for 
183011770 using UK, Finance Accounts and Davis, "English Foreign Trade" and extended to 
1841 based on Schlote, British Overseas Trade, p. 152. 
Imports: from Davis, "English Foreign Trade" and Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 466-
467 except for temperate agricultural imports for which 1841 estimates use the data in Davis, 
The Industrial Revolution adopting the correction for Ireland proposed by Thomas, "Food 
Supply", p. 145 with deflation using the agricultural price index in O'Brien, "Agriculture and the 
Home Market" extended to 1841 using the Rousseaux agricultural prices index. 
Goods Price Relatives: cottons from Harley, "Cotton Textile Prices"; other textiles, metal 
industries, other traded manufactures (represented by leather), and other industry (represented by 
construction) from O'Brien, "Agriculture and the Home Market" extended respectively using 
woolens export prices from ImIah, Economic Elements; bar iron from Mitchell , British Historical 
Statistics, p. 762, leather from Gayer et aI., Growth and Fluctuation, p. 143, 279, and building 
materials from J ones, Increasing Returns. 
Factor Price Relatives: these are nominal prices where capital is based on consols yields from 
Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 678 and capital goods prices from Feinstein, 
"Appendix", p. 441 , and land is taken from Twner et aI., Agricultural Rent, p. 150; cost of living 
index from Feinstein, "New Estimates". 
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Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis of 184111770 Multiples. 
Agriculture Elasticities = 1 
Benchmark Base NoDR Textile Manfg 
Outputs 
Cottons 125 98.4 38.3 49.9 124 
Other Textiles 2.3 3.3 2.8 3.7 4.1 
Metal Industries 14.3 11.2 5.2 10.3 11.4 
Other Traded Manufactures 4.0 2.8 2.0 2.7 2.1 
Other Industry 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.8 
Agriculture 2.0 2.3 4.8 2.2 2.3 
Services 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Exports 
Cottons 253 239 44.8 148 308 
Other Textiles 1.6 3.0 1.6 3.2 3.8 
Metal Industries 4.5 31.1 5.5 26.5 30.1 
Other Traded Manufactures 2.1 2.3 1.2 2.1 2.0 
Imports 
Temperate Agriculture 6.8 15.3 1.8 16.0 
Tropical Raw Materials 15.9 130 50.7 66 164 
Tropical Food 3.2 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.1 
Modem Industry ? 0.5 1.8 0.4 0.6 
Other Traded Manufactures ? 1.8 4.0 2.0 1.3 
Goods Price Relatives 
Cottons 7.5 7.5 8.1 7.4 7.3 
Other Textiles 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.6 
Metal Industries 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.4 
Other Traded Manufactures 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Other Industry 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Agriculture 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.1 
Factor Price Relatives 
Labor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Capital 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 
Land 0.6 0.3 na 0.3 0.3 
Cost of Living 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 
Note: the simulation shows Britain with no temperate agricultural imports but small exports in 
1770. 
Source: see text. 
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Table 4. Technological Progress in Other Traded Manufactures: Sensitivity Analysis of 
184111770 Multiples. 
Manufactures a = 1 
Benchmark Base OTM OTM 
TFP = 0.2 TFP = 0.5 
Outputs 
Cottons 125 98.4 120.3 115.2 
Other Textiles 2.3 3.3 4.1 4.0 
Metal Industries 14.3 11.2 11.2 11.2 
Other Traded Manufactures 4.0 2.8 2.5 3.3 
Other Industry 4.0 3.8 2.8 2.8 
Agriculture 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Services 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Exports 
Cottons 253 239 295 277 
Other Textiles 1.6 3.0 3.8 3.7 
Metal Industries 4.5 31.1 29.6 29.3 
Other Traded Manufactures 2.1 2.3 2.3 3.4 
Imports 
Temperate Agriculture 6.8 15.3 23.8 78.3 
Tropical Raw Materials 15 .9 130 159 152 
Tropical Food 3.2 2.0 2.1 2. 1 
Modem Industry ? 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Other Traded Manufactures ? 1.8 1.2 1.0 
Goods Price Relatives 
Cottons 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.3 
Other Textiles 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.6 
Metal Industries 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 
Other Traded Manufactures 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
Other Industry 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Agriculture 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Factor Price Relatives 
Labor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Capital 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Land 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Cost of Living 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Source: see text. 
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Table 5. Contributions to National Productivity Growtb, 1780-1860 (% per year). 
Variant I Variant 2 
Share TFP Amount TFP Amount TFP Amount 
Cotton 0.07 1.9 0.13 
Worsteds 0.035 1.3 0.05 
Wool ens 0.035 0.6 0.02 
Iron 0.02 0.9 0.02 
Canals & Railways 0.07 1.3 0.09 
Shipping 0.06 0.5 0.03 
Sum of Modemized 0.29 \.2 0.34 
Agriculture 0.27 0.7 0.19 
Other Traded Manfs 0.20 0.2 0.04 0.2 0.04 
Rest 0.65 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
All Others 0.85 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Total 1.41 0.55 0.55 0.59 
Sources: Harley, "Reassessing", p. 200 and for variants, see text. 
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Appendix Table 1: Accounting Matrix for Harley's 1993 Model 
BRITAIN Good: (+production - purchase) Factor Incomes: 
Modem Other Agri- Services Transport Labour Capital Rent 
Sector: indus culture 
Modem industry 12.4 5.0 7.4 
Other industry 22.0 13.2 8.8 
Agriculture 22.1 8.8 4.4 8.8 
Services 43.5 26.1 17.4 
Import 6.8 
Total available: 12.4 22.0 28.9 43.5 53. 1 38.1 8.8 





Modem industry lU 4.4 6.6 
Other industry 126.5 75.9 50.6 
Agriculture 297.0 118.8 59.4 118.8 
Services 2 19.2 131.5 87.7 
Transport 3.4 1.4 0.7 
Import 6.8 
Total available: 17.9 126.5 297.0 219.2 3.4 331.9 205.0 118.8 
Consumption 17.9 126.5 293 .6 219.2 0.0 
Exports 3.4 3.4 
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Appendix Table 2: Accounting Matrix for Complex CGE Model 
BRITAIN Good (+ production, - purchase): 
Cotton Other Metals Other Non- Agricu- Services Int'l Tropical Tropicall Labour Capital Rent 
Sector: textiles textiles traded traded Iture services Raw mat. food 
Cotton 10.3 -2.3 -2.7 -2.1 -3.2 
Other textiles 12.7 -3.4 -0.9 -3.4 -5.0 
Metal 4.2 -0.4 -1 .5 -2.3 
Other traded 8.7 -5 .2 -3.5 
Non-traded 8.7 -5.2 -3.5 
Agriculture 22.1 -8.8 -4.4 -8 .8 
Service 41 .8 -25.1 -16.7 
Inl'l Services 1.2 -0.7 -0.5 
Imports 0. 1 0.2 0.2 0.4 7.1 3.6 4.5 
Total final 10.4 12.9 4.4 8.7 6.4 25.8 41 .8 1.2 0.0 3.01 -52.1 -39.1 -8.8 Consumption 4.2 10.1 2.9 5.8 6.4 25.8 41 .8 0.0 0.0 3.0 -52.1 -39.1 -8.8 




Cotton 3.4 -0.8 -0.9 -0.7 -1 .0 
Other textiles 17.4 -4.7 -1.2 -4.6 -6.9 
Metal 3.7 -0.4 -1 .3 -2.0 
Other traded 12.9 -7 .7 -5.1 
Non-traded 15.8 -9.5 -6.3 
Agriculture 297.0 -11 8.8 -59.4 -11 8.8 
Service 214.2 -128.5 -85.7 
Tropical Ag. 22.0 -8.8 -4.4 -8.8 
limports 6.2 2.8 1.5 2.9 1.2 
Total final 9.6 20.2 5.2 15.4 15.0 292.3 214.2 1.2 19.9 -279.9 -170.9 -127.6 
Consumption 9.5 20.0 5.0 15.0 15.0 285.2 214.2 1.2 13.3 -279.9 -170.9 -127.6 
Exports 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 7.1 3.6 3.0 
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Appendix Table 3: Model Factor Inputs 1840 and 1770 
Britain Rest of World 
1840 1770 1840 1770 
Lab Cap Land Lab Cap Land Lab Cap Land Lab Cap Land 
V\griculture (Crafts) 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.35 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 
~griculture (Allen) 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Conon Textiles 0.2 1 0.3 1 2.40 3.60 0.21 0.31 0.96 1.44 
bther Textiles 0.26 0.40 0.80 1.20 0.26 0.40 0.80 1.20 
Metal Products 0.36 0.54 0.68 1.36 0.36 0.54 0.56 0.84 
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